Character-based symmetric searchable encryption and its implementation and experiment on mobile devices by Suga Takanori et al.
Character-based symmetric searchable
encryption and its implementation and
experiment on mobile devices
著者 Suga Takanori, Nishide Takashi, Sakurai
Kouichi
journal or
publication title
Security and communication networks
volume 9
number 12
page range 1717-1725
year 2016-08
権利 (C) 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
This is the peer reviewed version of the
following article: Security and communication
networks, 9:1717-1725, which has been
published in final form at 10.1002/sec.876.
This article may be used for non-commercial
purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and
Conditions for Self-Archiving.
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/00143828
doi: 10.1002/sec.876
SECURITY AND COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
Security Comm. Networks 0000; 00:1–10
DOI: 10.1002/sec
Special Issue
Character-based Symmetric Searchable Encryption
and Its Implementation and Experiment on Mobile Devices
Takanori Suga1;3, Takashi Nishide2, and Kouichi Sakurai1
1Kyushu University, 744, Motooka, Nishi-ku, Fukuoka, 819-0395, Japan
2University of Tsukuba, 1-1-1 Tennodai, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, 305-8577, Japan
3Currently working at NEC Corporation, Fuchu, Tokyo, Japan
ABSTRACT
Searchable encryption allows us to perform a keyword search over encrypted data. However, we cannot efficiently perform
some complex search (e.g., a wildcard search) with traditional searchable encryption schemes since they can deal with
only equality matches. Our symmetric searchable encryption can deal with partial matches. This allows us to efficiently
perform a wildcard search, a partial match search, and so on. We also examine the feasibility of our scheme by experiments
on a smartphone and tablet, and confirm our scheme can be used in these environments. Availability on portable devices
will offer high convenience. Copyright c 0000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
The advance in computer and telecommunication technol-
ogy made cloud computing widespread. In cloud comput-
ing, we let the cloud providers store and process our data.
To protect our sensitive data even from cloud providers,
we can encrypt our sensitive data before sending them to
the server. However, encryption generally prevents us from
performing efficient searches.
In recent years, searchable encryption was proposed.
We can perform a keyword search over encrypted data
with searchable encryption. Like traditional encryption
schemes, there exist the symmetric ones and asymmetric
ones. We focus on symmetric searchable encryption in this
work.
We show an example of the process flow of symmetric
searchable encryption. In this example, Alice (called data
owner) outsources her data to the server, Bob (called data
searcher) performs a keyword search, and Alice and Bob
share a symmetric secret key in advance.
1. Alice specifies some keywords that represent the
contents of the document.
2. Alice encrypts the document.
3. Alice encrypts the keywords specified in Step 1. We
call these encrypted keywords “index” in this paper.
4. Alice sends the encrypted document and the index
to the server.
5. The server stores the index and the encrypted
document in the database.
6. Bob specifies a keyword to perform a keyword
search.
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7. Bob encrypts the keyword specified in Step 6. We
call this encrypted keyword “trapdoor” in this paper.
8. Bob sends the trapdoor to the server.
9. The server searches the database for documents
associated with the keyword by using the trapdoor.
10. The server sends the search results (documents) to
Bob.
1.2. Related Work
The first practical searchable encryption scheme was
proposed by Song et al. in 2000 [1]. After their proposal,
many symmetric schemes were proposed [2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7]. The first asymmetric searchable encryption scheme
was proposed by Boneh et al. [8]. After their proposal,
many asymmetric schemes were proposed [9, 10]. Their
schemes only support an equality search. To enhance the
supported types of searches with existing schemes, we
must enumerate all possible keywords when we compute
a trapdoor. Suppose that as a keyword we specify the
creation date of the document like “2013/01/01” when
we compute an index, and we want to search documents
created in 2013. Then we must enumerate all dates in 2013
like “2013/01/01”, “2013/01/02”, : : :, “2013/12/31” if we
can use only eqaulity search.
In recent years, some schemes that aim to enhance
the supported types of searches were proposed. Li et al.
proposed the first symmetric searchable encryption scheme
that supports a fuzzy keyword search [11]. With a fuzzy
keyword search, we can find some similar keywords. For
example, we can find keyword “colour” with keyword
“color”. Sedghi et al. proposed the first asymmetric
searchable encryption scheme that supports a wildcard
search [12].
Goh proposed a symmetric searchable encryption
with Bloom filter [13] and Watanabe et al. proposed a
symmetric searchable encryption with Bloom filter for
relational database [14]. Goh’s scheme is more efficient
than our scheme when we have many keywords in a
document and we perform an equality search. However,
our scheme is more efficient than his scheme when we
perform some complex search like a wildcard search.
1.3. Our Contribution
In this work, we focus on how to create secure indexes for
encrypted documents as in most of the existing schemes.
Our scheme [15] has the following advantages:
 Our work is the first symmetric searchable
encryption that does not require us to enumerate
all possible keywords to perform a wildcard search.
That is, as we mentioned above, we need to
enumerate all possible similar keywords when
we want to perform a wildcard search with all
previous schemes except Sedghi et al.’s asymmetric
searchable encryption [12].
 Our work can decrease the index size of wildcard-
based fuzzy keyword search proposed by Li et
al. [11] from O(`d) to O(1) where a keyword
length ` and an edit distance d. In their scheme,
both the data owner and the data searcher must
enumerate possible similar keywords represented
by a wildcard keyword. However, in our scheme,
only the data searcher needs to enumerate possible
similar keywords represented by a wildcard
keyword.
 With our scheme, we can achieve a partial-matching
keyword search efficiently.
In general, symmetric searchable encryption schemes
can be performed more efficiently than asymmetric ones.
Furthermore, we show the efficiency of our scheme by
performing it on a tablet and even on a smartphone.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1. Notations
We use the following notations in this paper.
Symmetric difference. Given two sets A and B, A4B
denotes a symmetric difference A4B = (A 
B) [ (B  A).
Random number. Given a set S, x R   S means that x is
chosen at random from the set S.
The number of elements. Given a set S, jSj denotes the
number of elements in S.
String concatenation. Given two strings a and b, a k b
denotes a concatenation of the strings a and b.
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Character. Given a string (or array) w and a position n,
w[n] denotes n-th character in the string w.
Logical operations. Given two logical values a and b,
a ^ b denotes a logical AND between a and b, and
a _ b denotes a logical OR between a and b.
2.2. Pseudo-Random Functions
A pseudo-random function is a function computationally
indistinguishable from a random function. To be more
precise, given a bit length n of an input, a bit length 
of a secret key and a bit length m of an output, we say
f : f0; 1gn  f0; 1g ! f0; 1gm is a (t; ; q)-pseudo-
random function if it satisfies the following properties:
 Given an input x 2 f0; 1gn and a secret key sk 2
f0; 1g, f(x; sk) can be computed efficiently.
 No t time algorithm B with at most q adaptive
oracle queries can distinguish between f(; sk) and
a random function F : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gm with an
advantage more than .
That is, jPr[Bf(;sk) = 0jsk R   f0; 1g] 
Pr[Bg = 0jg R   fF : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gmg]j < .
In this paper, we use a keyed hash function like HMAC-
SHA256 [16, 17] as a pseudo-random function.
2.3. Symmetric Key Encryption
We use a symmetric key encryption scheme, denoted
as  =
 
Setup(1);Enc(sk; );Dec(sk; ). Given a
security parameter , Setup(1) outputs a secret key.
Given a secret key sk and an input, Enc(sk; ) encrypts
the input and Dec(sk; ) decrypts the input with the secret
key sk.
2.4. Bloom Filter
Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure
[18]. We can put some elements into this data structure and
can test if the Bloom filter contains some elements. Bloom
filter has a false-positive. That is, for example, the Bloom
filter that has two elements “foo” and “bar” might say it
has “baz”. However, Bloom filter does not have a false-
negative. That is, the Bloom filter that has two elements
“foo” and “bar” never says it does not have “foo”.
A Bloom filter is an m-bit array initialized with 0’s.
To add an element x, we compute k hash functions
h1(x); :::; hk(x), and we make h1(x)-th bit, ..., and
hk(x)-th bit be 1. To test if the Bloom filter has an element
x, we also compute k hash functions h1(x); :::; hk(x),
and check if all bits in the array with the positions
h1(x); :::; hk(x) are 1’s. If all bits are 1’s, the Bloom filter
probably has the element (though this can be an error).
Otherwise, the Bloom filter never has the element.
For each hash function hi, we will use keyed hash
function with a secret key.
2.5. Security Model
The security model we use for a symmetric searchable
encryption is based on IND-CKA [13]. We define a
security model named IND-CPSKAy because our scheme
generates indexes from one keyword while Z-IDX [13]
generates indexes from a collection of keywords.
This security model is defined by the following game
between a challenger C and an adversary A as follows.
Setup. C picks a set S of q pairs of a position and a
character, and sends S to A. A picks some subsets
S0, that is, keywords picked from S, and sends S0 to
C. After C receives S0, C executes KeyGen to obtain
a secret key sk and executes BuildIndex to obtain
indexes for all subsets in S0. Finally, C sends all
indexes to A. We note that the information about
which keyword (a subset) corresponds to which
index is not given to A.
Query. A is allowed to query trapdoors for some
keywords (or search expressions) to C. For each
trapdoor Tx for a keyword (or a search expression)
x, A can execute SearchIndex to check if an index
I matches the trapdoor Tx. Here we can assume
a search expression x does not include _ (i.e., a
logical OR) because A can obtain trapdoors for
x1 _ x2 by obtaining a trapdoor for x1 and a
trapdoor x2 separately.
Challenge. A picks nonempty two subsets V0 and V1
from S0 such that jV0   V1j 6= 0, jV1   V0j 6= 0
and jV0j = jV1j. Also V0; V1 must satisfy that no
trapdoor for a set K of pairs of a position and a
character was already queried by A where jK \
(V04V1)j > 0 z. Also V0; V1 must satisfy that
IND-CKA denotes Indistinguishability against Chosen Keyword Attack.
yIND-CPSKA denotes Indistinguishability against Chosen Position-Specific
Keyword Attack.
zThis is the generalized restriction compared with IND-CKA [13].
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no index for a set K is given to A where jK \
(V04V1)j > 0 x.
A sends V0 and V1 to C. C picks b 2 f0; 1g at
random and sends an index for Vb { to A. After
A receives the index for Vb, A cannot query
the trapdoors that do not follow the restriction
mentioned above.
Response. A outputs b0 to guess b. The advantage of A
is defined as AdvA = jPr[b = b0]  1=2j. This is
an advantage over the probability thatA guesses by
tossing a coin.
We say that an adversary A (t; ; q)-breaks the
symmetric searchable encryption scheme if the advantage
of A AdvA is at least  after A takes at most t time
and queries trapdoors to the challenger C at most q times.
The symmetric searchable encryption scheme I is (t; ; q)-
IND-CPSKA secure if no adversary can (t; ; q)-break I.
3. PROPOSED SCHEME
In our scheme, we use a Bloom filter per keyword to
generate an index or a trapdoor. We also use pseudo-
random functions to add elements to Bloom filters. The
documents can be encrypted with any encryption scheme
(out of scope of this paper).
We assume that there is an upper bound u of the
keyword length. We note that each keyword is terminated
with null, which is an end of the keyword string.
null allows us to specify an explicit keyword length in
performing a search.
We express a keyword search as a DNF logical
formula p = (p(1;1) ^ ::: ^ p(1;m1)) _ ::: _ (p(n;1) ^
::: ^ p(n;mn)). For example, we express an equality search
for (“dog” OR “cat”) as p = ((w[1] = ‘d’) ^ (w[2] =
‘o’) ^ (w[3] = ‘g’) ^ (w[4] = null)) _ ((w[1] =
‘c’) ^ (w[2] = ‘a’) ^ (w[3] = ‘t’) ^ (w[4] = null)).
For this search expression (“dog” OR “cat”), we will
generate two Bloom filters and as the search results we
xWe need this restriction because an index and a trapdoor have the similar data
structure in our scheme.
{The index for Vb will be similar to one of the indexes given in the Setup phase,
but we note that the information about which keyword (a subset) corresponds to
which index is not given to A as mentioned before.
can obtain encrypted documents associated with keywords
“dog” or “cat”.
We show four algorithms of our scheme.
KeyGen(1) This algorithm is a key generator. Given
a security parameter , this outputs a secret key
sk
R   f0; 1g.
BuildIndex(sk;FID; w) This algorithm is used to
generate an index. Given a secret key sk, a file
identifier FID and a keyword w, generate an index
as follows:
1. Initialize a Bloom filter II, that is, initialize a
bit array with 0’s.
2. For each i 2 f1; jwjg, add an element
i k w[i] (i.e., a pair of a position and
a characterk) to the Bloom filter II by
using keyed hash functions with sk.
That is, if the keyword w is “dog”
for example, w is viewed as a search
expression p = ((w[1] = ‘d’) ^ (w[2] =
‘o’) ^ (w[3] = ‘g’) ^ (w[4] = null)).
3. Given an upper bound u of keyword lengths,
add (u  jwj) random elements to the Bloom
filter II to conceal the keyword length. Given
a bit length m of Bloom filter and the number
of pseudo-random functions k of the Bloom
filter, we can set (u  jwj)  k random bits
to 1 in the Bloom filter II instead of adding
(u  jwj) random elements.
4. Encrypt a concatenated string FID k w as
III = Encsk(FID k w).
5. Output the index I = (FID; II; III).
Trapdoor(sk; p) This algorithm is used to gener-
ate a trapdoor. Given a secret key sk and
a search expression p = (p(1;1) ^ ::: ^ p(1;m1)) _
::: _ (p(n;1) ^ ::: ^ p(n;mn)), this outputs a trap-
door T = fT1; :::; Tng. We compute Ti for each
i 2 [1; n] as follows:
1. Initialize a Bloom filter Ti, that is, initialize a
bit array with 0’s.
2. For each term p(i;j) (j 2 [1;mi]), add a
concatenated string x k c (i.e., a pair of a
kWe assume that a null is a special character.
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position and a character) to the Bloom filter
Ti where p(i;j) is a term w[x] = c.
SearchIndex(T; Idx) This algorithm is used by the server
to search for encrypted documents with matching
indexes. Given a trapdoor T = fT1; :::; Tng and a
collection of indexes Idx in the database, the server
searches for matching indexes as follows. Now let
Ti 2 T and I 2 Idx. For each pair of (Ti; I), we
do the following:
1. Let I = (FID; II; III).
2. Let J be the set of positions such that if
Ti[j] = 1, j 2 J .
3. For each j 2 J , check if II[j] = 1. If all
the bits corresponding to J are 1’s in II yy,
the server returns, to the data searcher, the
encrypted document corresponding to FID
and III.
We note that the data searcher can use III to
know the exact keyword w even if a false-positive
happens because of the Bloom filter’s property.
Search Examples
If we do the wildcard search such as “2013/??/??”, we
can use a search expression p = ((w[1] = ‘2’) ^ (w[2] =
‘0’) ^ (w[3] = ‘1’) ^ (w[4] = ‘3’) ^ (w[5] =
‘/’) ^ (w[8] = ‘/’) ^ (w[11] = null)) and generate a
trapdoor corresponding to this search expression.
If we want to find a keyword that has a prefix “pre”, we
can use a search expression p = ((w[1] = ‘p’) ^ (w[2] =
‘r’) ^ (w[3] = ‘e’)) without specifying a null.
If we use a DNF search expression such as (“dog” OR
“cat”), we generate two Bloom filters corresponding to
“dog” and “cat” respectively as shown in the description
of Trapdoor(sk; p), and send the two Bloom filters to
the server. The server executes SearchIndex() by using
the two Bloom filters respectively to find the documents
associated with “dog” or “cat” as shown in the description
of SearchIndex(T; Idx).
For example, if Document 1 is associated with keyword
“dog” and Document 2 is associated with “cat”, we will
We assume that a null is a special character.
yyi.e., if the set of 1’s included in the Bloom filter Ti is a subset of the set of 1’s
included in the Bloom filter II , we have the keyword match.
1st bit is 0 1st bit is 1
2nd bit is 1
3rd bit is 0
This leaf is 010
Figure 1. Example of a binary tree of indexes
obtain both Document 1 and Document 2 as the search
results of the search expression (“dog” OR “cat”).
Index Management on Server Side for Efficient
Search
The indexes created by a data owner are sent to the server
and the server uses the indexes to search for the encrypted
documents with trapdoors. The index management on the
server side for executing SearchIndex of our scheme can
be implemented with a binary tree search method as well
as a linear search method as follows.
Linear search. The first approach is a naive but simple
approach, that is, a linear search. Given a Bloom
filter Ti in the trapdoor T , the server checks all
the indexes exhaustively and the server chooses the
matching indexes.
Binary tree search. The second approach is an optimized
search, that is, a binary tree search. In this search,
we construct a binary tree such that each edge
represents a bit (e.g., the left node corresponds
to 0 and the right node corresponds to 1) from
the Bloom filter II in the index I. We show an
example of a binary tree for four Bloom filters
f010; 011; 101; 110g in Figure 1. Each leaf node
has FID and III.
When we search this binary tree with a trapdoor
101, we can ignore left nodes of the root node
because the first bit must be 1 but their first bits are
0’s, thus avoiding the exhaustive search. We need to
follow both left and right child nodes when a bit of
a trapdoor is 0 (e.g., second bit of 101).
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4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
4.1. Security Proof
We give the security proof of our scheme based on the
security model in Section 2.5.
Theorem 1
Let k be the number of pseudo-random functions for
a Bloom filter. Our scheme is (t; ; q=k)-IND-CPSKA
secure if a pseudo-random function f for the Bloom filter
is a (t; ; q)-pseudo-random function.
Proof
We prove this theorem by basically following the proof for
Z-IDX [13] with necessary adaptations.
We prove this theorem with its contrapositive, that is, we
assume our scheme is not (t; ; q=k)-IND-CPSKA secure.
Then we show that we can construct the algorithm B that
can distinguish between a pseudo-random function and a
random function by using A as a subroutine.
Given an input x, B can use an oracle O which outputs
f(x; sk) or g(x) to evaluate f or g whenever necessary.
Setup. B picks a set S of q=k pairs of a position and
a character from f0; 1gn at random, and sends
the set S to A. A returns a collection S0 of
polynomially many subsets. For each subset Dzz 2
S0, B executes BuildIndex with D and a file
identifier FIDD picked at random. B sends all
indexes for S0 to A.
Query. B executes Trapdoor for a keyword (or a search
expression) x if A queries a trapdoor and outputs
a trapdoor Tx for the keyword (or the search
expression) x. Here we can assume a search
expression x does not include _ (i.e., a logical
OR) because A can obtain trapdoors for x1 _ x2
by obtaining a trapdoor for x1 and a trapdoor x2
separately.
Challenge. A picks nonempty subsets V0 and V1 from S0
such that jV0   V1j 6= 0, jV1   V0j 6= 0 and jV0j =
jV1j. Also V0; V1 must satisfy that no trapdoor for
a set K of pairs of a position and a character was
already queried by A where jK \ (V04V1)j > 0.
zzUsually this corresponds to one keyword.
Also V0; V1 must satisfy that no index for a set K is
given to A where jK \ (V04V1)j > 0.
A sends V0 and V1 to B. B picks b 2 f0; 1g and a
file identifier FIDb at random, executes BuildIndex,
and sends the index toA. AfterA receives the index
for Vb, A cannot query the trapdoors that do not
follow the restriction mentioned above.
Response. A outputs b0 to guess b. B outputs 0 if b =
b0. This means f is a pseudo-random function.
Otherwise, B outputs 1. This means f is a random
function.
B takes at most t time becauseA takes at most t time. B
sends at most q queries to O because there exist only q=k
pairs of a position and a characters in S, A sends at most
q=k queries, and B sends k queries per A’s single query.
The following lemmas show that B has an advantage
greater than  to determine if the oracle O corresponds to
a pseudo-random function f or a random function g.
However, this contradicts the definition of pseudo-
random function.
Therefore, the theorem is proven.
Lemma 1
jPr[Bf(;sk) = 0jsk R   f0; 1g]  1
2
j is non-negligible if
f is a pseudo-random function.
Proof
B simulates C in an IND-CPSKA game perfectly and we
assume that A can break our scheme (i.e., our scheme is
not (t; ; q=k)-IND-CPSKA secure). Therefore, the proof
of this lemma is immediate.
Lemma 2
Pr[Bg = 0jg R   fF : f0; 1gn ! f0; 1gmg] = 1
2
if g is a
random function.
Proof
All we have to consider are Challenge subsets V0 and V1
since other subsets in S0 do not leak any information about
the Challenge subsets.
Without loss of generality, assume that V04V1 has two
pairs x; y of a position and a character such that x 2 V0
and y 2 V1, and A guesses b with an advantage . That is,
given an output g(z), A distinguishes z = x from z = y.
If g is a random function chosen at random,  must be 0.
Therefore, we proved this lemma.
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4.2. Limitation
Our scheme has a limitation as the existing schemes.
Our scheme divides a trapdoor into clauses. For
example, when we perform a search with a search
expression (“dog” OR “cat”) by using a DNF formula,
the server obtains two trapdoors from the data searcher.
Though the sever cannot obtain the plaintexts of the
keywords “dog” and “cat” from the trapdoors, the server
can know the distinct search results for “dog” and “cat”
respectively.
Not only our scheme but also many of the existing
schemes have this limitation (e.g., Goh’s scheme [13], Li
et al.’s scheme [11]).
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Given a bit length m of a Bloom filter, an index consists of
FID, an m-bit Bloom filter (II ) and III (which depends
on the symmetric encryption scheme). Assume that the
search expression can be divided by disjunctions into n`
terms. The size of the trapdoor is n`m bits because the
trapdoor consists of n` (m-bit) Bloom filters. Given the
total number of characters in all keywords `m and the
number of pseudo-random functions for the Bloom filer k,
the execution time of BuildIndex is O(`m) since we must
compute `m  k (k is constant) pseudo-random functions.
5.1. Implementation as a Native Application
One approach to implement a searchable encryption
scheme is to implement it as a native application. We
implement our scheme with an equality search on an
Intel Core i7 2600K CPU. We used a 256-bit Bloom
filter and symmetric key encryption AES [19] and keyed
hash function HMAC-SHA256 [16, 17] as pseudo-random
functions. Given a secret key sk and an input x, let HMAC-
SHA256 be f(sk; x). We can use HMAC-SHA256 as
distinct pseudo-random functions fi(sk; x) = f(sk; i k
x).
We show the result of this experiment in Figures 2 and
3.
Usually the keyword length will be relatively small
(we assume it will be about 10 bytes here for example).
The run times of BuildIndex and Trapdoor are less than
1 millisecond for 10-byte keywords. Even if we have a
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Figure 2. Run time of BuildIndex as a native application.
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Figure 3. Run time of Trapdoor as a native application.
1000-byte keyword, we need only about 10 milliseconds.
Therefore, we believe our scheme is practical in this
environment.
5.2. Implementation as a Web Application.
Another approach is to implement it as a web application.
We also implemented BuildIndex and Trapdoor with
JavaScript, and had an experiment in a browser Google
Chrome.
We show the result of this experiment in Figures 4 and
5 on the same environment as in Section 5.1.
In these figures, we see these run times are relatively
slower than the results for a native application. However,
when we have 10-byte keyword, we need only about 2
milliseconds.
We also show the result of this experiment on a tablet
(Google Nexus 7: 1.3 GHz NVIDIA Tegra 3 quad core
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Figure 4. Run time of BuildIndex as a web application.
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Figure 5. Run time of Trapdoor as a web application.
CPU) in Figures 6 and 7, and on a smartphone (SHARP
AQUOS PHONE ZETA: 1.5 GHz Qualcomm Snapdragon
S4 MSM8960 dual core CPU) in Figures 8 and 9.
We see these run times are further slower than the results
for a web application with a PC. However, when we have
10-byte keyword, we need only about 20 milliseconds with
a tablet and about 30 milliseconds with a smartphone.
Therefore, we believe our scheme can be deployed on a
tablet and even a smartphone.
6. CONCLUSION
In this work, we presented a searchable symmetric
encryption scheme. Our scheme supports not only an
equality search but also other types of searches like a
wildcard search based on comparisons per character. We
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Figure 6. Run time of BuildIndex on a tablet.
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Figure 7. Run time of Trapdoor on a tablet.
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Figure 8. Run time of BuildIndex on a smartphone.
implemented our scheme as a native application and as
a web application. We confirmed our scheme can be
deployed not only as a native application but also as a web
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Figure 9. Run time of Trapdoor on a smartphone.
application. Furthermore, we confirmed our scheme can be
used even on a tablet and a smartphone.
In our experiment as a web application, we assumed the
server does not alter the script file to avoid the encryption.
However, the script file might be altered by the malicious
cloud provider or an intruder. Therefore, we need some
mechanisms to make sure that the script file is not altered
and our data will be encrypted. To implement our scheme
as a browser add-on might be a countermeasure against
this attack. Designing and implementing this mechanism
are our future work.
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